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I. INTRODUCTION
In Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co.,1 the Supreme Court of the United
States handed down a decision expressly mandating that judges disqualify
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1. 129 S. Ct. 2252 (2009).
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themselves when a case involves their big donors.2 The Supreme Court held
that a judge must be disqualified when an interested party's spending created
actual bias because it had a "disproportionate influence" on the ruling judge.3
The focal point of the decision is to show how campaign contributions can
create grounds for necessary disqualification for elected judges-not just
bias, prejudice, or pecuniary gain any more.4
This article will provide an overview of the recent Supreme Court deci-
sion in Caperton. Section II will showcase background information that led
to the decision in Caperton. Section III will review the grounds that require
a judge to be disqualified; and will discuss what led to the recent decision in
Caperton. Section IV will begin by highlighting the purpose of the opinion;
it will discuss the Court's new financial outlook toward mandatory disquali-
fication. Section V will discuss the possible future consequences of the deci-
sion. The latter part of Section V will review the dissenting opinions that
were entered in the decision. Section VI will discuss the writer's conclusion
as to whether this decision will put an end to any sort of bias or prejudice
that a litigant might have to face and whether this decision will do more
harm than good.
II. BACKGROUND INFORMATION
The initial cost of judicial elections has continued to rise for years, and
contributors are donating more than ever to try to gain favor among judges.5
The costs of running or keeping a judicial office has increased to such a de-
gree that a judge must take donations or take the chance of losing.6 There-
fore, more judges are susceptible to being bought by contributors giving
large campaign contributions. 7 The question of whether judges must disqua-
lify themselves when a case involves one of their big donors is one that has
been left unanswered for years. Hugh M. Caperton, the owner of various
mining industries in West Virginia, sued A.T. Massey Coal Co. for tortious
interference in 1998.8 The suit was brought because Mr. Caperton felt Mr.
Don L. Blankenship, the chief executive officer of A.T. Massey Coal Co.,
2. Id. at 2265-66.
3. Adam Liptak, Justices Issue Recusal Rule for Judiciary, N.Y. TIMES, June 9, 2009, at
A].
4. See Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2263.
5. David Barnhizer, "On the Make": Campaign Funding and the Corrupting of the
American Judiciary, 50 CATH. U. L. REV. 361, 378 (2001).
6. Id.
7. See id.
8. Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 679 S.E.2d 223, 233 (W. Va. 2008), rev'd by 129
S. Ct. 2252 (2009).
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interfered with his existing contracts and tried to devalue his mine in order to
cause him to go into bankruptcy.9 A circuit court in West Virginia found
A.T. Massey Coal Co. liable for tortious interference and awarded Caperton
$50 million in punitive and compensatory damages.' °
Coincidently, the race for West Virginia State Supreme Court of Ap-
peals occurred in 2004." The incumbent Justice Warren McGraw was being
challenged by Brent Benjamin.' 2 Mr. Blankenship opposed Justice McGraw
being reelected because he felt Mcgraw was not the right person for the job.'3
Blankenship spent $3 million trying to get Justice McGraw off the bench and
replaced with Benjamin." The race was won by Benjamin, and after the
victory, Blankenship immediately filed his petition to have the State Su-
preme Court of Appeals re-hear his punitive damages case. 5 Caperton
moved to disqualify Justice Benjamin and two of the other sitting Justices
under the Due Process Clause because of Blankenship's campaign involve-
ment.' 6 Photographs of Chief Justice Maynard had been leaked to the public
showing him vacationing with Blankenship in the French Rivera during the
time the case was still pending.' 7 Chief Justice Maynard immediately disqu-
alified himself from the proceedings after the pictures surfaced.' 8 Also, Jus-
tice Starcher granted Massey's disqualification motion because of the public
criticism Justice Benjamin had received due to his involvement with Blan-
kenship.' 9 However, Justice Benjamin dismissed the motion and commented
that there was no sort of bias involved in the suit.
20
9. Id. at 232-33.
10. Id. at 233.
11. Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 129 S. Ct. 2252, 2257 (2009).
12. Id.
13. See id.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 2258.
16. Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2257.
17. Id. at 2258.
18. Id.
19. Id. Justice Starcher commented: "Blankenship's bestowal of his personal wealth,
[political tactics], and friendship have created a cancer in the affairs of this Court. And I have
seen that cancer grow and grow .... I believe that my stepping aside in the instant case might
be a step in treating that cancer .... Penny J. White, "The Appeal" to the Masses, 86 DENy.
U. L. REV. 251, 279 (2008) (quoting Notice of Voluntary Disqualification of the Hon. Larry
V. Starcher, Justice of the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia, A.T. Massey Coal Co.
v. Caperton, No. 33350 (Feb. 15, 2008), reprinted in SAMPLE ET AL, BRENNAN CTR. FOR
JUSTICE, FAIR COURTS: SITING RECUSAL STANDARDS 19 (2008)).
20. Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2257-58.
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In 2007, the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals reversed the $50
million verdict against Blankenship and his company.2 Caperton wanted
another hearing and moved to disqualify three of the five justices that sat for
the prior trial. 22 All but Justice Benjamin recused themselves, and the hear-
ing was held; however, the verdict was reversed once again.2 3 Justice Ben-
jamin filed a concurring opinion in the Caperton case, where he defended his
decision not to disqualify himself as well as the majority opinion.24 Justice
Benjamin, in his concurring opinion, stated he had no "'direct, personal, sub-
stantial, [or] pecuniary interest"' in the result of the case.25 Caperton then
applied for and was granted certiorari to the Supreme Court of the United
States.26
III. BEFORE CAPERTON v. A.T. MASSEY COAL CO.
A. When Disqualification is Necessary
Judicial disqualification has been around longer than the Constitution it-
self.2 7 Disqualification procedures were derived from English common law;
however, the United States has developed the procedures into what they are
now. 28 The Roman Code of Justinian and Jewish law also had provisions for
the disqualification of judges based on the suspicion of bias or pecuniary
gain.29 In English common law, the "rule of necessity" required a judge to
hear a case even if there was direct pecuniary gain, if there was no sufficient
21. Id. at 2258.
22. Id.
23. Id. "Not only is the majority opinion unsupported by the facts and existing case law,
but it is also fundamentally unfair. Sadly, justice was neither honored nor served by the ma-
jority." Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 679 S.E.2d 223, 284 (W. Va. 2008) (Albright, J.,
dissenting), rev'd by 129 Ct. 2252 (2009).
24. See Caperton, 679 S.E.2d at 258-309 (Benjamin, J., concurring).
25. Id. at 301. Justice Benjamin further noted that by adopting "a standard merely of
appearances,' [he concluded], seems little more than an invitation to subject West Virginia's
justice system to the vagaries of the day-a framework in which predictability and stability
yield to supposition, innuendo, half-truths, and partisan manipulations." Id. at 306.
26. Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2259.
27. John A. Meiser, Note, The (Non)Problem of a Limited Due Process Right to Judicial
Disqualification, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1799, 1803 (2009). "'[D]isqualification' describes
the statutorily or constitutionally mandated removal of a judge (typically on motion by one of
the parties), whereas 'recusal' refers to a judge's voluntary decision to step down from a case.
.Id. at 1802 n.29 (emphasis omitted).
28. Id. at 1803.
29. Id. at 1803--04.
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substitute available.3° Therefore, judges in early common law were only
required to disqualify themselves in the slimmest of situations.31 All judges
are different in their concepts of ethical conduct and in their motivations.32
Judicial disqualification matters will probably continue to be decided mainly
on a case-by-case basis, and many additional decisions are likely to be essen-
tial in fleshing out the components of mandatory disqualification. 33 There
are rules set in place to ensure judges uphold a level of impartiality when
ruling in any type of case. 4 "[T]he importance of maintaining the appear-
ance of impartiality in the judiciary" has always been at the heart of the
American system.35 The right to be heard in a neutral tribunal before an im-
partial judge is guaranteed in the Due Process Clause in the Constitution of
the United States.36
30. Id. at 1804; see Paul B. Lewis, Systemic Due Process: Procedural Concepts and the
Problem of Recusal, 38 U. KAN. L. REV. 381, 383 (1990).
31. Meiser, supra note 27, at 1804.
32. Todd Lochner, Judicial Recusal and the Search for the Bright Line, 26 JUST. SYS. J.
231, 232 (2005).
33. Id.
34. See, e.g., MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, R. 2.11 (2007); see also Cnty. of Santa
Clara v. Superior Court, 235 P.3d 21, 35 (Cal. 2010). "It is well established that the disquali-
fication rules applicable to adjudicators are more stringent than those that govern the conduct
of prosecutors and other government attorneys." Cnty. of Santa Clara, 235 P.3d at 35 n.12
(citing People v. Freeman, 222 P.3d 177, 178 (Cal. 2010)).
35. Wersal v. Sexton, 613 F.3d 821, 846 (8th Cir. 2010) (en banc) (Bye, J., dissenting).
Alexander Hamilton captured this need for an impartial judiciary when he wrote:
The benefits of the integrity and moderation of the judiciary have already been felt in more
States than one; and though they may have displeased those whose sinister expectations they
may have disappointed, they must have commanded the esteem and applause of all the vir-
tuous and disinterested. Considerate men of every description ought to prize whatever will
tend to beget or fortify that temper in the courts; as no man can be sure that he may not be to-
morrow the victim of a spirit of injustice, by which he may be a gainer today. And every man
must now feel, that the inevitable tendency of such a spirit is to sap the foundations of public
and private confidence and to introduce in its stead universal distrust and distress.
Id. (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 454 (Alexander Hamilton) (Am. Bar Ass'n ed.,
2009)).
36. See Young v. United States ex rel. Vuitton et Fils S.A., 481 U.S. 787, 798-99 (1987)
(citing In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 273 (1948)). "No State shall make or enforce any law
which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any
State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to
any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV,
§ 1.
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1. Grounds for Disqualification
Judges are not afforded the same kind of "across-the-board 'out"' that
lawyers receive, even when they elect to join the judiciary.37 Taking on the
role of a judge could entail being an "impartial umpire" or a "trustee of the
common law," but whatever role the judge has, he cannot let individual mor-
al judgment get in the way of applying just the law.38 "The judicial judgment
in applying the Due Process Clause must move within the limits of accepted
notions of justice and is not to be based upon the idiosyncrasies of a merely
personal judgment .... An important safeguard against such merely individ-
ual judgment is an alert deference ....
Under the 2007 ABA Model Code of Judicial Conduct, a judge has an
obligation to disqualify himself "in any proceeding in which the judge's im-
partiality might reasonably be questioned."' ° The grounds for which a judge
is to be disqualified from hearing a case include when there is actual bias or
prejudice against an interested party.41 Another ground for disqualification is
when the judge has a pecuniary interest in the outcome of the case.42
a. Actual Bias or Prejudice
A judge must be disqualified in cases where actual bias or prejudice can
be shown.43 However, this is a hard burden to prove because there is a pre-
sumption that judges are impartial whenever trying a case."n In Black's Law
37. Sarah M. R. Cravens, In Pursuit of Actual Justice, 59 ALA. L. REV. 1, 28 n.133
(2007). For instance, a judge cannot avoid ruling on a mass tort case "just because she thinks
it would be too time consuming or" inject personal feelings while he is involved in a case. Id.
at 20 n.93. This ought to mean not only that he will not decline the case, but that he will not
let his personal views into the rationale and decision of the case to affect the outcome of the
proceeding. Id. This is all part of the duty of being a judge. Id.
38. Id.at28n.133.
39. Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 68 (1947) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
40. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 2.11 (A) (2007).
41. Id. R. 2.11 (A)(I). A judge shall disqualify himself if he has "a personal bias or pre-
judice concerning a party or a party's lawyer." Id.
42. Id. R. 2.11(A)(2)(c). A judge shall disqualify himself when the
judge knows that the judge, the judge's spouse or domestic partner, or a person within the third
degree of relationship to either of them, or the spouse or domestic partner of such a person is a
person who has more than a de minimis interest that could be substantially affected by the pro-
ceeding.
Id. R. 2.11 (A)(2), (A)(2)(c).
43. See MacDonald v. Ford Motor Co., 324 N.W.2d 489, 491 (Mich. Ct. App. 1982) (per
curiam).
44. See id.
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Dictionary, the phrase "actual bias" is defined as "[g]enuine prejudice that a
judge, juror, witness, or other person has against some person or relevant
subject."45 Also, the word "prejudice" is defined in Black's Law Dictionary
as "[d]amage or detriment to one's legal rights or claims."'  Judges are not
perfect; prejudice and bias cannot always be kept out of court.47 "Judges are
human beings, and so they can never completely transcend the limits of their
own experiences and perspectives.' In Public Utilities Commission of the
District of Columbia v. Pollak,49 Justice Frankfurter commented:
The judicial process demands that a judge move within the frame-
work of relevant legal rules and the covenanted modes of thought
for ascertaining them. He must think dispassionately and sub-
merge private feeling on every aspect of a case. There is a good
deal of shallow talk that the judicial robe does not change the man
within it. It does. The fact is that on the whole judges do lay aside
private views in discharging their judicial functions. This is
achieved through training, professional habits, self-discipline and
that fortunate alchemy by which men are loyal to the obligation
with which they are entrusted.50
Actual bias and prejudice really matter "when it moves the deci-
sion[maker] away from reasoning or outcomes that are in accordance with
the law and towards those that are in accordance with something else (e.g.,
personal, non-legal reasons)."" The burden to show that a judge is biased
for or against a party, or that prejudice has been shown, is on the shoulders of
the petitioners.52 In order for a judge to be disqualified, the bias or prejudice
must also be personal rather than judicial.5 3 An interested party is "entitled
to a judge who will hear both sides and decide an issue on the merits of the
45. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 145 (9th ed. 2009). The term "bias" is defined as:
"[i]nclination; prejudice; [or] predilection." Id.
46. Id. at 1018. Legal prejudice is defined as: "A condition that, if shown by a party,
will usu[ally] defeat the opposing party's action; esp[ecially], a condition that, if shown by the
defendant, will defeat a plaintiffs motion to dismiss a case without prejudice." Id.
47. See Bracy v. Schomig, 286 F.3d 406, 426 (7th Cir. 2002).
48. Id.
49. 343 U.S. 451 (1952).
50. Id. at 466 (Frankfurter, J.) (explaining nonparticipation in decision).
51. Cravens, supra note 37, at 29.
52. See Bracy, 286 F.3d at 411.
53. Alley v. State, 882 S.W.2d 810, 821 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1994) (citing State ex rel.
Wesolich v. Goeke, 794 S.W.2d 692, 697 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990)); State v. Smith, 242 N.W.2d
320, 324 (Iowa 1976).
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law. 54 However, an interested party is not guaranteed a judge with a clean
slate. 55 "Each judge brings to the bench the experiences of life, both personal
and professional. A lifetime of experiences that have generated a number of
general attitudes cannot be left in chambers when a judge takes the bench."56
An interested party seeking judicial disqualification must visibly and affir-
matively prove bias or prejudice.57
In order to succeed on a motion to disqualify under the general rule, an
interested party must demonstrate that conditions "exist which reflect pre-
judgment of the case by the judge or a leaning of his mind in favor of one
party to the extent that his decision in the matter is based on grounds other
than the evidence placed before him. '58 Also, the bias or prejudice must
stem from an extrajudicial basis in order to be disqualifying. 59 If the bias or
prejudice does not stem from an extrajudicial source, the judge is not re-
quired to disqualify himself unless his behavior demonstrates "pervasive
bias" against a litigant.60
b. Pecuniary Interest
Impartiality is missing when judges have a pecuniary interest in the re-
sult of the case. 6' The Supreme Court has held that judges must disqualify
themselves in situations where they have a pecuniary interest in fees, forfei-
tures, or fines payable by parties before them.62 Additionally, federal law
requires judges be disqualified if they or any member of their family have a
54. Madsen v. Prudential Fed. Servs. & Loans Ass'n, 767 P.2d 538, 546 (Utah 1988); see
Alley, 882 S.W.2d at 819.
55. Madsen, 767 P.2d at 546.
56. Id.; see also Dep't of Revenue v. Golder, 322 So. 2d 1, 6 (Fla. 1975) (citing Laird v.
Tatum, 409 U.S. 824, 835 (1972)).
57. Cliche v. Fair, 487 A.2d 145, 148 (Vt. 1984) (quoting In re Shuttle, 306 A.2d 667,
670 (Vt. 1973)).
58. TZ Land & Cattle Co. v. Condict, 795 P.2d 1204, 1211 (Wyo. 1990) (quoting Pote v.
State, 733 P.2d 1018, 1021 (Wyo. 1987)). The Due Process Clause frequently requires judges
to disqualify "themselves when they face possible temptations to be biased, even when they
exhibit no actual bias against a party or a case [sic]." Bruce A. Green, May Judges Attend
Privately Funded Educational Programs? Should Judicial Education be Privatized?: Ques-
tions of Judicial Ethics and Policy, 29 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 941, 946 (2002) (quoting Del Vec-
chio v. Ill. Dep't of Corr., 31 F.3d 1363, 1372 (7th Cir. 1994) (en banc)).
59. See Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 564 (1994) (Kennedy, J., concurring). The
term "extrajudicial" is defined as: "Outside court; outside the functioning of the court sys-
tem." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 521 (9th ed. 2009).
60. See Liteky, 510 U.S. at 551.
61. See Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 532 (1927); see generally 16B AM. JUR. 2D Consti-
tutional Law § 582 (2004).
62. Tumey, 273 U.S. at 535.
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pecuniary interest in the outcome of the proceeding.63 No amount of money
received by a judge is minor enough to fall within the maxim "de minimis
non curat lex."'  Furthermore, in no case has the Court ever found any
amount of money to be so trifling as to be overlooked, and it has been stated
that any pecuniary interest of a judge in a case heard by the judge, however
isolated, may disqualify the judge.65
2. Landmark Decisions
There are a plethora of cases that helped shaped what modern disquali-
fication law is today. However, Caperton has stepped in and changed the
landscape of judicial disqualification forever.6 6 The Caperton Court held
that there were two instances where disqualification was necessary that place
67Thfisthe facts of Caperton in perspective. The first instance is where a judge has
a pecuniary interest in the result of the proceeding.68 The second instance is
in criminal contempt hearings, where a judge has ruled in an earlier proceed-
ing then went on to try and convict the same litigant.69 These six landmark
decisions illustrate these two distinct types of instances where judicial disqu-
alification was required.
a. Tumey v. Ohio
The Court in Tumey v. Ohio70 held that the Due Process Clause requires
a judge to disqualify himself when he has "a direct, personal, substantial, [or]
63. 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(4) (2006). A judge shall be disqualified if:
He knows that he, individually or as a fiduciary, or his spouse or minor child residing in his
household, has a financial interest in the subject matter in controversy or in a party to the pro-
ceeding, or any other interest that could be substantially affected by the outcome of the pro-
ceeding.
Id. The term "'financial interest' means ownership of a legal or equitable interest, however
small, or a relationship as director, adviser, or other active participant in the affairs of a party."
28 U.S.C. § 455(d)(4); see generally Leslie W. Abramson, Specifying Grounds for Judicial
Disqualification in Federal Courts, 72 NEB. L. REV. 1046 (1993).
64. Rollo v. Wiggins, 5 So. 2d 458, 462 (Fla. 1942) (en banc); see also Tumey, 273 U.S.
at 531; Conkling v. De Lany, 91 N.W.2d 250, 255 (Neb. 1958); In re Tullius, 137 N.E.2d 312,
315 (Ohio Prob. Ct. 1955). The maxim "de minimis non curat lex" is defined as: "[t]he law
does not concern itself with trifles." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 390 (9th ed. 2009).
65. See Tumey, 273 U.S. at 532.
66. See generally Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 129 S. Ct. 2252 (2009).
67. Id. at 2259-61.
68. Id. at 2259-60.
69. Id. at 2261.
70. 273 U.S. 510 (1927).
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pecuniary interest" in the outcome of the proceeding. 7' In Tumey, the defen-
dant was arrested, charged, and convicted with unlawfully possessing intox-
icating liquor by a mayor of a village.72 Ed Tumey was fined $100 and or-
dered to stay in jail until the time he could pay the fine.73 Tumey moved to
disqualify the Mayor because the Mayor had a pecuniary interest in sentenc-
ing him, thus requiring disqualification under the Fourteenth Amendment's
Due Process Clause.74 The Mayor received a portion of his salary from per-
forming judicial duties that were funded by the fines collected, and the mo-
nies collected from the fines went to the village treasury. 7' The Court held
disqualification was necessary under the principle:
Every procedure which would offer a possible temptation to the
average man as a judge to forget the burden of proof required to
convict the defendant, or which might lead him not to hold the bal-
ance nice, clear and true between the [sitate and the accused, de-
nies the latter due process of law.
76
Therefore, the Tumey Court held the Due Process Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment required disqualification "both because of [the judge's]
direct pecuniary interest in the outcome, and because of his official motive to
convict and to graduate the fine to help the financial needs of the village."77
b. Withrow v. Larkin
The Supreme Court in Withrow v. Larkin78 held disqualification is re-
quired in circumstances where "the probability of actual bias on the part of
71. Id. at 523; see John P. Frank, Disqualification of Judges, 56 YALE L.J. 605, 609
(1947). 'The common law of disqualification.., was clear and simple: ajudge was disquali-
fied for direct pecuniary interest and for nothing else." Id. at 609. The Due Process Clause
"may sometimes bar trial by judges who have no actual bias and who would do their very best
to weigh the scales of justice equally between contending parties." In re Murchison, 349 U.S.
133, 136 (1955).
72. Tumey, 273 U.S. at 515.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 517, 520.
76. Id. at 532.
77. Tumey, 273 U.S. at 535. "A situation in which an official perforce occupies two
practically and seriously inconsistent positions, one partisan and the other judicial, necessarily
involves a lack of due process of law in the trial of defendants charged with crimes before
him." Id. at 534 (citing City of Boston v. Baldwin, I N.E. 417, 418 (Mass. 1885); State ex rel.
Colcord v. Young, 12 So. 673, 676 (Fla. 1893)).
78. 421 U.S. 35 (1975).
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the judge or decisionmaker is too high to be constitutionally tolerable."'7 9
Some of those circumstances include: when the adjudicator has a pecuniary
interest in the result8° and when the judge has been a personal target of abuse
or criticism from the parties.8 Furthermore, the Withrow Court held disqua-
lification is necessary if "under a realistic appraisal of psychological tenden-
cies and human weakness" the interest "poses such a risk of actual bias or
prejudgment that the practice must be forbidden if the guarantee of due
process is to be adequately implemented."82
c. Ward v. Village of Monroeville
The Court, in Ward v. Village of Monroeville,83 addressed whether a
mayor's court decision was allowable, even though the fines levied went to
the town rather than to the mayor himself.84 In Ward, the defendant was
convicted of two traffic offenses and was assessed a fine.85 The defendant
argued his due process rights were infringed upon because the judge was not
impartial.86 Although the Mayor did not receive direct compensation from
the fines imposed, the town received a monetary benefit from the fines.87
The Court held that "'the mere union of the executive power and the judicial
power in him cannot be said to violate due process of law .. . ."88 The test
to decide whether disqualification is necessary in situations such as the
mayor's is one "'which would offer a possible temptation to the average man
as a judge to forget the burden of proof required to convict the defendant, or
which might lead him not to hold the balance nice, clear and true between the
State and the accused."' 89
79. Id. at 47.
80. Id. (citing Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564, 579 (1973); Ward v. Village of Mo-
nroeville, 409 U.S. 57, 60 (1972); Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v. Cont'l Cas. Co., 393
U.S. 145, 148-49 (1968) (discussing the consequences of pecuniary interests with regards to
judges); Tumey, 273 U.S. at 523).
81. Withrow, 421 U.S. at 47 (citing Taylor v. Hayes, 418 U.S. 488, 501 (1974); Mayberry
v. Pennsylvania, 400 U.S. 455, 465 (1971); Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 578-79
n.2 (1968); Ungar v. Sarafite, 376 U.S. 575, 584 (1964)).
82. Id.
83. 409 U.S. 57 (1972).
84. Id. at 59-60.
85. Id. at 57.
86. Id. at 58.
87. Id.
88. Ward, 409 U.S. at 60 (quoting Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 534 (1927)).
89. Id. (quoting Tumey, 273 U.S. at 532).
2011]
11
Gitterman: Taking on Big Money: How Caperion Will Change Judicial Disqualifi
Published by NSUWorks, 2011
NOVA LAW REVIEW
d. Aetna Life Insurance Co. v. Lavoie
In Aetna Life Insurance Co. v. Lavoie,90 the Court required the disquali-
fication of a state Supreme Court Justice where the Justice casts the deciding
vote in a punitive damages award, while being the main witness in a very
similar case in a lower court.9 The Lavoie Court further articulated:
The Due Process Clause "may sometimes bar trial by judges who
have no actual bias and who would do their very best to weigh the
scales of justice equally between contending parties. But to per-
form its high function in the best way, 'justice must satisfy the ap-
pearance of justice.' ' 92
Additionally, the Lavoie Court emphasized that "what degree or kind of
interest is sufficient to disqualify a judge from sitting 'cannot be defined with
precision.' '' 93 Furthermore, the Court felt having an objective component in
the test was essential. 94
e. In re Murchison
The In re Murchison95 Court addressed instances where a judge shall be
disqualified when they have no pecuniary interest, but a conflict still arises
because the judge participated in an earlier proceeding.96 The judge ex-
amined the petitioners to determine if charges of bribery and gambling
should be assessed.97 The first petitioner answered the judge's questions, but
the judge found the petitioner's answers untruthful and charged him with
perjury. 98 The second petitioner refused to answer the judge's questions be-
cause he did not have counsel, which was required by state law.99 The judge
90. 475 U.S. 813 (1986).
91. Id. at 828.
92. Id. at 825 (quoting In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955)).
93. Id. at 822 (quoting In re Murchison, 349 U.S. at 136).
94. See id. "The Due Process Clause demarks only the outer boundaries of judicial dis-
qualification. Congress and the states, of course, remain free to impose more rigorous stan-
dards for judicial disqualification .... " Lavoie, 475 U.S. at 828; see also State v. Harris, 786
N.W.2d 409, 424 (Wis. 2010). "'[T]he difficulties of inquiring into actual bias ... simply
underscore the need for objective rules."' Id. (quoting Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 129
S. Ct. 2252, 2263 (2009)).
95. 349 U.S. 133 (1955).
96. Id. at 134.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 134-35.
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proceeded to charge the second petitioner with contempt."° The judge then
tried and convicted both petitioners.' °' The Court set aside the criminal con-
victions because the judge had a conflict of interest due to the fact he partici-
pated in the trial and sentencing stage.1
0 2
The Court explained the general rule that "no man can be a judge in his
own case and no man is permitted to try cases where he has an interest in the
outcome.' 1 3 Therefore, disqualification was required by the judge in this
situation because "[h]aving been a part of [the entire] process a judge cannot
be, in the very nature of things, wholly disinterested in the conviction or ac-
quittal of those accused.' 4 The Court concluded this point because "[a]s a
practical matter it is difficult if not impossible for a judge to free himself
from the influence of what took place in his 'grand-jury' secret session."' 0 5
f. Mayberry v. Pennsylvania
In Mayberry v. Pennsylvania,'0 6 the petitioner was tried for attempting
to break out of prison and holding hostages inside a prison.'07 Mayberry
represented himself in the proceedings. 0 8 The trial concluded with a verdict
of guilt against Mayberry.' °9 When the petitioner was brought in for sentenc-
ing the judge found him guilty of criminal contempt and sentenced him to a
term of eleven to twenty-two years. "0 The Court dismissed the criminal con-
tempt charges because a litigant "should be given a public trial before a
judge other than the one reviled by the contemnor."''. Therefore, the Court
articulated the question to be asked when trying to decide whether disqualifi-
cation is necessary is not whether the judge was biased, but whether the typi-
cal judge is going to be neutral, because if not, there will be an unconstitu-
tional "potential for bias."
' 12
100. In re Murchison, 349 U.S. at 135.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 138-39.
103. Id. at 136.
104. Id. at 137.
105. In re Murchison, 349 U.S. at 138.
106. 400 U.S. 455 (1971).
107. Id. at 455.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id.
1I1. Mayberry, 400 U.S. at 466.
112. Id. at 465-66; see Taylor v. Hayes, 418 U.S. 488, 501 (1974).
2011]
13
Gitterman: Taking on Big Money: How Caperion Will Change Judicial Disqualifi
Published by NSUWorks, 2011
NOVA LAW REVIEW
Similarly, in Offutt v. United States, 13 the defendant was charged and
convicted of criminal contempt because he showed countless displays of
disrespect to the judge during his trial for abortion." 4 The Court held that a
judge who had become personally involved in an antagonistic relationship
with the litigant before him should have transferred the case to another judge
based on the concept of justice."'
B. The Lead-Up to Caperton
The issue of whether large campaign contributions can constitute
grounds for disqualification of a judge is a question that has been left unans-
wered for years."16 A large number of state court judges are elected and
count on campaign contributions to help them win over the public and get
elected.'1 7 More likely than not, once such judges are elected, a case will
come before them involving a person who donated to their judicial cam-
paign." 8 Once this happens, the opposing party will often file a motion to
disqualify the judge based on lack of impartially because of campaign con-
tributions, but oftentimes these motions fail." 9 The courts argue a reasonable
person would not interpret a judge as being biased simply because a person
has contributed to the judge's campaign. 20 Also, it would be unrealistic to
113. 348U.S. 11(1954).
114. Id. at 1-12.
115. Id. at 17-18.
[Where conditions do not make it impracticable, or where the delay may not injure public or
private right, a judge called upon to act in a case of contempt by personal attack upon him,
may, without flinching from his duty, properly ask that one of his fellow judges take his place.
Cooke v. United States, 267 U.S. 517, 539 (1925).
116. James Sample & Michael Young, Invigorating Judicial Disqualification: Ten Poten-
tial Reforms, 92 JUDICATURE 26, 26 (2008). "'The improper appearance created by money in
judicial elections is one of the most important issues facing our judicial system today. A line
needs to be drawn somewhere to prevent a judge from hearing cases involving a person who
has made massive campaign contributions to benefit the judge."' Id. at 29. (quoting Theor-
dore B. Olson, former U.S. Solicit. Gen.).
117. John Copeland Nagle, The Recusal Alternative to Campaign Finance Legislation, 37
HARV. J. ON LEGiS. 69, 87 (2000).
118. Id.
119. Id.; see Shepherdson v. Nigro, 5 F. Supp. 2d 305, 307 (E.D. Pa. 1998); Texaco, Inc.
v. Pennzoil Co., 729 S.W.2d 768, 844-45 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987). In Texaco Inc., a judge re-
fused to disqualify himself after he received a large campaign contribution from Pennzoil's
counsel after Pennzoil filed its answer. Id.; see also Coley v. Bagley, No. 1:02CV0457, 2010
WL 1375217, at *37 (N.D. Ohio Apr. 5, 2010); Ala. Dep't of Pub. Safety v. Prince, 34 So. 3d
700, 706 (Ala. Civ. App. 2009); see In re Marriage of Thesing, No. H034272, 2010 WL
602555, at *16-18 (Cal. Ct. App. 2010).
120. See Nagle, supra note 117, at 88.
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expect to never see a campaign contributor, because it is an inevitable conse-
quence to judicial elections. 121
One court made a noteworthy statement when it wrote, "[t]he overriding
priority ... is to assure that our courts are impartial, and that they have the
appearance of impartiality."' 122 This sentiment alone should be the overriding
factor in any case before any judge.123 The problem of campaign contribu-
tions potentially creating bias is growing more and more, as elections be-
come more expensive. 124 When judges refuse to disqualify themselves in
situations where "their campaign finances reasonably call into question their
impartiality," the ABA has suggested the disqualification of any judge who
accepted a large campaign contribution from a litigant appearing before
them. 125
The ABA drafted a rule for campaign contributions: Disqualification is
mandatory when a party, a party's lawyer, or a party's law firm has provided
the judge aggregate contributions above a certain amount, within a certain
amount of time.'2 6 One problem with the ABA rule is that, in states with
reasonable restrictions, the possibility for apparent or real corruption is ad-
dressed by the restrictions, which no one may legally go beyond. 127 Another
problem this rule invites is that gamesmanship could defeat its purpose.12 8
"If the contribution threshold were set at a reasonable level, parties or law-
yers could disqualify an unfavorable judge by making contributions . . .
121. See Rocha v. Ahmad, 662 S.W.2d 77, 78 (Tex. App. 1983).
A candidate for the bench who relies solely on contributions from nonlawyers must reconcile
himself to staging a campaign on something less than a shoestring. If a judge cannot sit on a
case in which a contributing lawyer is involved as counsel, judges who have been elected
would have to recuse themselves in perhaps a majority of the cases filed in their courts.
Id.
122. Breakstone v. Mackenzie, 561 So. 2d 1164, 1172 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1989) (en
banc), aff'd in part, quashed in part sub nom. MacKenzie v. Super Kids Bargain Store, 565
So. 2d 1332, 1340 (Fla. 1990); see also Wersal v. Sexton, 613 F.3d 821, 844 (8th Cir. 2010)
(enbanc).
123. Breakstone, 561 So. 2d at 1172. See Wersal, 613 F.3d at 844 (Bye, C.J., dissenting).
124. Sample & Young, supra note 116, at 29.
125. Deborah Goldberg et al., The Best Defense: Why Elected Courts Should Lead Recus-
al Reform, 46 WASHBURN L.J. 503, 528-29 (2007). See Sample & Young, supra note 116, at
26; RICHARD E. FLAMM, JUDICIAL DISQUALIFICATION: RECUSAL DISQUALIFICATION OF JUDGES
§ 3.8 (3d ed. 1996). The concept that a party should be allowed "to peremptorily challenge a
judge suspected of bias formed the basis for the ... judicial disqualification statutes that" are
still in place in most countries. Id.
126. Sample & Young, supra note 116, at 29. "'Aggregate contributions' are meant to
include both direct and indirect gifts made to a candidate." Id. (quoting MODEL CODE OF
JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 2.11 (A)(4) (2007)).
127. Goldberg et al., supra note 125, at 529.
128. Id.
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above that amount to her campaign committee."'' 29 These are the main rea-
sons no state has adopted the per se ABA rule. 130 The states with reasonable
limits to campaign contributions would be better off making a rule that re-
quires disqualification after the acceptance of aggregate contributions of a set
amount-not from a sole donor but jointly from all donors related to a liti-
gant.13' Almost every court has discarded the thought that campaign contri-
butions require judicial disqualification. 32 Thus, the respondents in Caper-
ton felt that if the Court imposed a "probability of bias" standard, it would
also apply "to other types of support [that] a judge receives-including en-
dorsements from newspapers, trade and labor organizations, and civic
groups.''33 The respondents in Caperton further argued that a "probability of
bias" standard is unfeasible, because "it fails to propose "'any test for distin-
guishing what the Constitution prohibits from what it permits."",134 The res-
pondents felt as though these types of judicial disqualification motions would
encourage more unnecessary litigation.
35
Justice Benjamin's behavior is nothing new to the Court. 36 Supreme
Court Justice Hugo Black did not disqualify himself in a case involving his
former law partner, which drew criticism from his fellow Justices. 137 Su-
preme Court Justice William Rehnquist drew harsh criticism for ruling in a
case about a federally funded surveillance program that was started while he
was still employed at the United States Department of Justice.13 Additional-
ly, Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia received harsh criticism from his
fellow Justices and the legal community for taking part in a case involving
then Vice President Dick Cheney, with whom he had recently gone hunt-
ing. 39 The legal community has high hopes that the Caperton decision has
finally put to rest the issue of whether judicial disqualification is necessary in
129. Id.
130. See id. Before the decision in Caperton, Alabama was the only state that clearly
required elected judges to disqualify themselves when major contributors were before them.
Peter A. Joy, A Professionalism Creed for Judges: Leading by Example, 52 S.C. L. REV. 667,
675 n.28 (2001) (citing Ex parte Kenneth D. McLeod, Sr., Family Ltd. P'ship XV, 725 So. 2d
271, 274 (Ala. 1998) (per curiam)) [hereinafter Ex Parte McLeod Family P'Ship].
131. See Goldberg et al., supra note 125, at 529.
132. Conrad C. Daly & Evan Ennis, Supreme Court Previews: Caperton v. Massey Coal
Company 08-22, FED. LAW, May 2009, at 62, 64 (Carrie Evans ed.).
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. See Meiser, supra note 27, at 1800-01.
137. Id. at 1801-02.
138. Id. at 1802.
139. Id.
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cases involving a "probability of bias" when judges are hearing cases involv-
ing their big donors.
V. THE INTEGRATION OF CAPERTON
A. The Purpose of the Opinion
The Court in Caperton held that a judge must now disqualify himself in
cases involving big donors where there is a "probability of bias. 14° Judicial
autonomy "declines in direct proportion to a judge's [reliance] on others for
[monetary] support" in order to get and keep judicial office. 14 ' A judge's
need to gain or keep judicial office is at the "heart of judicial corruption." 14 2
"Anecdotal evidence suggests that judicial candidates believe that being able
to outspend opponents is critical to winning elections.' ' 143 Thus, this decision
has determined that a judge must disqualify himself in cases involving the
judge's big donors to avoid ruining the judge's own reputation, as well as the
integrity of the judgment and the court system as a whole.144 However, the
Court has stipulated that not every campaign contribution by an interested
party or the party's attorney creates a probability of bias that requires a
judge's disqualification.1 45
B. The Court's New Financial Outlook
The inquiry into whether a judge must now disqualify himself depends
on the contribution's relative amount compared to the total sum of money
given to the campaign, the entire amount spent in the election, and the ob-
vious effect the contribution had on the result of the election. 146 The Caper-
ton Court noted that:
140. Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 129 S. Ct. 2252, 2263-64 (2009); see State v.
Cooke, No. 0506005981, 2010 WL 3734113, at *34 (Del. Super. Ct. Aug. 19, 2010); see also
Priceline.com, Inc. v. City of Anaheim, 103 Cal. Rptr. 3d 521, 536 (Cal. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
2010).
141. Barnhizer, supra note 5, at 370.
142. Id. at 394.
143. Aman McLeod, Bidding for Justice: A Case Study About the Effect of Campaign
Contributions on Judicial Decision-Making, 85 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 385, 388 (2008) (cit-
ing Stuart Banner, Note, Disqualifying Elected Judges from Cases Involving Campaign Con-
tributors, 40 STAN. L. REV. 449, 457 (1988)).
144. Daly & Ennis, supra note 132, at 63.
145. Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2263. The Court in Lavoie determined that some pecuniary
interests are "too remote and insubstantial" to be disqualifying. Id. (quoting Aetna Life Ins.
Co. v. Lavoie, 475 U.S. 813, 826 (1986)).
146. Id. at 2264.
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[T]here is a serious risk of actual bias-based on objective and
reasonable perceptions-when a person with a personal stake in a
particular case had a significant and disproportionate influence in
placing the judge on the case by raising funds or directing the
judge's election campaign when the case was pending or immi-
nent.14
7
"The temporal relationship between the campaign contributions, the jus-
tice's election, and the pendency of the case is also critical" when determin-
ing whether a campaign contribution should disqualify a judge. 148 Judicial
integrity is an essential state interest. 49 Therefore, it is of the upmost impor-
tance to make sure every case comes before an impartial judge.1 50 The Court
reiterated the point that states may decide to "'adopt recusal standards more
rigorous than due process requires."'' 5' The Court further commented that
"the codes of judicial conduct provide more protection than due process re-
quires" and that the majority of disputes over judicial disqualification could
be solved without turning to the Constitution.152
V. THE POSSIBLE IMPLICATIONS
A. The Potential Consequences of the Decision
The decision in Caperton will have a drastic impact on elected judges
who receive campaign contributions from supporters. 5 3 The decision further
changes the grounds for disqualification to include a benefit a judge receives,
rather than a payment."' From this point on, judges must disqualify them-
selves in cases involving their big donors if a motion for disqualification is
filed in a timely fashion. 55 This new standard of necessary disqualification
for judges could cause federalism problems because this new rule requires all
states to throw away their disqualification procedures and to adopt a univer-
sal standard.5 6 The federal government has put its foot down when it comes
to disqualification when there is a "probability of bias," thereby invading
147. Id. at 2263-64; Wersal v. Sexton, 613 F.3d 821, 839 (8th Cir. 2010) (en banc).
148. Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2264.
149. Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 793 (2002) (Kennedy, J., concur-
ring).
150. See Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2265-66.
151. Id. at 2267 (quoting White, 536 U.S. at 794 (Kennedy, J., concurring)).
152. Id.
153. Daly & Ennis, supra note 132, at 63.
154. Id.
155. See id.
156. Meiser, supra note 27, at 183 1.
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states rights that were supposed to be protected by the idea of federalism.' 57
The Court has even commented that federalism problems might limit the
power the federal government has over the state courts.
158
In Gregory v. Ashcroft,159 the Court faced the issue of whether state-
imposed age qualifications were constitutionally permissible.' 60 The Court
held, "Congressional interference with this decision of the people of Mis-
souri, defining their constitutional officers, would upset the usual constitu-
tional balance of federal and state powers. For this reason, 'it is incumbent
upon the federal courts to be certain of Congress' intent before finding that
federal law overrides' this balance." 16' This new disqualification standard
should be interpreted as a means to force judges to disqualify themselves, not
as a measure to give interested parties any new due process rights. 162 There-
fore, this new burden on judges to prove there is no bias for or against any
litigant is in no way in line with the belief that judges are sworn to administer
unbiased justice. 163
B. The Dissenters
Justices Roberts and Scalia both authored dissenting opinions in Caper-
ton because they each felt the decision left too much open for discussion."
They shared the view that this decision would come back and haunt the
Court for years to come. 165 Furthermore, both of the Justices share the pre-
diction that this decision would clog up the judiciary with unnecessary dis-
157. Id. at 1831-32. The Fourteenth Amendment was not supposed to weaken the idea of
federalism, leaving states at the mercy of the federal government. See Steven G. Calabresi,
We Are All Federalists, We Are All Republicans: Holism, Synthesis, and the Fourteenth
Amendment, 87 GEO. L.J. 2273, 2301 (1999) (reviewing AKHIL REID AMAR, THE BILL OF
RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUcTION (1998)). The Fourteenth Amendment is an element
of a bigger constitutional system that incorporates certain structural features, such as federal-
ism, and it is through this light that it should be explained. Id.
158. Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 460 (1991).
159. 501 U.S. 452 (1991).
160. Id. at 455.
161. Id. at 460 (quoting Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 243 (1985),
superseded by statute, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-7(a)(l)).
162. Meiser, supra note 27, at 1833.
163. Id.
164. See Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 129 S. Ct. 2252, 2267 (2009) (Roberts, C.J.,
dissenting).
165. See id. at 2274 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting); id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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qualification motions and as a pitfall of this the American citizens would lose
respect for the bench."6
1. Justice Roberts
Justice Roberts felt the majority's decision will not promote the values
of judicial impartiality, but rather undermine them. 67 He viewed the Court's
interpretation that the Due Process Clause now requires judges to disqualify
themselves because of a "probability of bias" as a misinterpretation. 68 Jus-
tice Roberts urged that a "probability of bias" cannot always be looked at in
a defined way. 169 Justice Roberts felt the majority's new rule requiring judi-
cial disqualification provided no direction to judges and interested parties
about when disqualification will be constitutionally necessary. 170 He pro-
posed forty fundamental questions that all federal and state court judges must
answer to decide if they are required to disqualify themselves in any matter
before them.'7 ' All members of the judiciary take an oath to apply the law
166. Id. at 2274 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting); id. (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also People v.
Aceval, 781 N.W.2d 779, 782-83 (Mich. 2010); Marek v. State, 14 So. 3d 985, 1000 (Ha.
2009) (per curiam); Bradbury v. Eismann, No. CV-09-352-S-BLW, 2009 WL 3443676, at *3-
4 (D. Idaho Oct. 20, 2009), aff'd by 395 F. App'x 410 (9th Cir. 2010); see generally State v.
Allen, 778 N.W.2d 863 (Wis. 2010) (per curiam); U.S. Fid. Ins. & Guar. Co. v. Mich. Cata-
strophic Claims Ass'n, 773 N.W.2d 243 (Mich. 2009).
167. Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2267 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id. The Court's failure to express a "'judicially discernable and manageable stan-
dard' strongly counsels against the recognition of a novel constitutional right." Id. at 2272
(quoting Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 306 (2004)).
171. See Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2269-72 (Roberts, J., dissenting). Justice Roberts pro-
posed these forty fundamental questions that state and federal judges will now have to deter-
mine:
(I) How much money is too much money? What level of contribution or expenditure gives
rise to a "probability of bias"? (2) How do we determine whether a given expenditure is "dis-
proportionate"? Disproportionate to what? (3) Are independent, non-coordinated expendi-
tures treated the same as direct contributions to a candidate's campaign? What about contribu-
tions to independent outside groups supporting a candidate? (4) Does it matter whether the li-
tigant has contributed to other candidates or made large expenditures in connection with other
elections? (5) Does the amount at issue in the case matter? What if this case were an em-
ployment dispute with only $10,000 at stake? What if the plaintiffs only sought non-monetary
relief such as an injunction or declaratory judgment? (6) Does the analysis change depending
on whether the judge whose disqualification is sought sits on a trial court, appeals court, or
state supreme court? (7) How long does the probability of bias last? Does the probability of
bias diminish over time as the election recedes? Does it matter whether the judge plans to run
for reelection? (8) What if the "disproportionately" large expenditure is made by an industry
association, trade union, physicians' group, or the plaintiffs' bar? Must the judge recuse in all
cases that affect the association's interests? Must the judge recuse in all cases in which a party
or lawyer is a member of that group? Does it matter how much the litigant contributed to the
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association? (9) What if the case involves a social or ideological issue rather than a financial
one? Must a judge recuse from cases involving, say, abortion rights if he has received "dis-
proportionate" support from individuals who feel strongly about either side of that issue? If
the supporter wants to help elect judges who are "tough on crime," must the judge recuse in all
criminal cases? (10) What if the candidate draws "disproportionate" support from a particular
racial, religious, ethnic, or other group, and the case involves an issue of particular importance
to that group? (II) What if the supporter is not a party to the pending or imminent case, but
his interests will be affected by the decision? Does the Court's analysis apply if the supporter
"chooses the judge" not in his case, but in someone else's? (12) What if the case implicates a
regulatory issue that is of great importance to the party making the expenditures, even though
he has no direct financial interest in the outcome ... ? (13) Must the judge's vote be outcome
determinative in order for his non-recusal to constitute a due process violation? (14) Does the
due process analysis consider the underlying merits of the suit? Does it matter whether the de-
cision is clearly right (or wrong) as a matter of state law? (15) What if a lower court decision
in favor of the supporter is affirmed on the merits on appeal, by a panel with no "debt of grati-
tude" to the supporter? Does that "moot" the due process claim? (16) What if the judge voted
against the supporter in many other cases? (17) What if the judge disagrees with the suppor-
ter's message or tactics? What if the judge expressly disclains the support of this person? (18)
Should we assume that elected judges feel a "debt of hostility" towards major opponents of
their candidacies? Must the judge recuse in cases involving individuals or groups who spent
large amounts of money trying unsuccessfully to defeat him? (19) If there is independent re-
view of a judge's recusal decision, e.g., by a panel of other judges, does this completely forec-
lose a due process claim? (20) Does a debt of gratitude for endorsements by newspapers, in-
terest groups, politicians, or celebrities also give rise to a constitutionally unacceptable proba-
bility of bias? How would we measure whether such support is disproportionate? (21) Does
close personal friendship between a judge and a party or lawyer now give rise to a probability
of bias? (22) Does it matter whether the campaign expenditures come from a party or the par-
ty's attorney? If from a lawyer, must the judge recuse in every case involving that attorney?
(23) Does what is unconstitutional vary from State to State? What if particular States have a
history of expensive judicial elections? (24) Under the majority's "objective" test, do we ana-
lyze the due process issue through the lens of a reasonable person, a reasonable lawyer, or a
reasonable judge? (25) What role does causation play in this analysis? . .. (26) Is the due
process analysis less probing for incumbent judges-who typically have a great advantage in
elections-than for challengers? (27) How final must the pending case be with respect to the
contributor's interest? What if, for example, the only issue on appeal is whether the court
should certify a class of plaintiffs? Is recusal required just as if the issue in the pending case
were ultimate liability? (28) Which cases are implicated by this doctrine? Must the case be
pending at the time of the election? Reasonably likely to be brought? What about an impor-
tant but unanticipated case filed shortly after the election? (29) When do we impute a proba-
bility of bias from one party to another? Does a contribution from a corporation get imputed to
its executives, and vice-versa? Does a contribution or expenditure by one family member get
imputed to other family members? (30) What if the election is nonpartisan? What if the elec-
tion is just a yes-or-no vote about whether to retain an incumbent? (31) What type of support
is disqualifying? What if the supporter's expenditures are used to fund voter registration or
get-out-the-vote efforts rather than television advertisements? (32) Are contributions or ex-
penditures in connection with a primary aggregated with those in the general election? What if
the contributor supported a different candidate in the primary? Does that dilute the debt of gra-
titude? (33) What procedures must be followed to challenge a state judge's failure to recuse?
May Caperton claims only be raised on direct review? ... (34) What about state-court cases
that are already closed? . . . (35) What is the proper remedy? After a successful Caperton mo-
tion, must the parties start from scratch before the lower courts? Is any part of the lower court
judgment retained? (36) Does a litigant waive his due process claim if he waits until after de-
cision to raise it? Or would the claim only be ripe after decision, when the judge's actions or
vote suggest a probability of bias? (37) Are the parties entitled to discovery with respect to the
judge's recusal decision? (38) If a judge erroneously fails to recuse, do we apply harmless-
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impartially and uphold the Constitution, and they should be trusted to live up
to this standard. 172  Furthermore, Justice Roberts felt there were only two
situations where the Due Process Clause requires disqualification: 1) "when
the judge has a financial interest in the outcome of the case" and 2) when a
judge presides over certain types of criminal contempt hearings.' 73 In most
instances, the Constitution of the United States leaves the issues of judicial
disqualification and judicial ethics to be handled by state legislators.174 Jus-
tice Roberts further commented that questions of disqualification are regu-
lated by statute, common law, and by the ethics boards of the bar and
bench. 75 In any particular case, a number of factors could lead to prejudice
or the appearance of bias. 176 Those factors could include: prior employment
history, friendship with a party or the party's lawyer, religious affiliation,
and many more situations. 77 Furthermore, never before has the Court ruled
that the "probability of bias" required disqualification in any case. 178
Justice Roberts sees the majority's decision leaving judges at the federal
and state level "to act as political scientists (why did candidate X win the
election?), economists (was the financial support disproportionate?), and
psychologists (is there likely to be a debt of gratitude?).' ' 179 He feels this
decision will lead to a clogging of our judicial system with unnecessary Ca-
perton motions. 80  Justice Roberts is also of the opinion that opening the
error review? (39) Does the judge get to respond to the allegation that he is probably biased,
or is his reputation solely in the hands of the parties to the case? (40) What if the parties settle
a Caperton claim as part of a broader settlement of the case? Does that leave the judge with no
way to salvage his reputation? Id.
172. Id. at 2267 (Roberts, J., dissenting) (citing Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536
U.S. 765,796 (2002)).
173. Id. at 2267 (Roberts, J., dissenting).
174. Green, supra note 58, at 947 (citing Del Vecchio v. I11. Dep't of Corr., 31 F.3d 1363,
1391 (7th Cir. 1994) (en banc) (Easterbrook, J., concurring)). "All questions of judicial quali-
fication may not involve constitutional validity. Thus matters of kinship, personal bias, state
policy, remoteness of interest, would seem generally to be matters merely of legislative discre-
tion." Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 523 (1927).
175. Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2268 (Roberts, J., dissenting) (citing Bracy v. Gramley, 520
U.S. 899, 904 (1997)). "[M]ost questions concerning a judge's qualifications to hear a case
are not constitutional ones, because the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
establishes a constitutional floor, not a uniform standard." Bracy, 520 U.S. at 904.
176. Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2268 (Roberts, J., dissenting).
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Id. at 2272.
180. Id. at 2273; see Zurita v. Lombana, 322 S.W.3d 463, 470 n.1 (Tex. Ct. App. 2010).
In Zurita, the appellants made a Caperton motion claiming that there was sufficient evidence
to show actual bias by the trial judge. Id. The appellate court dismissed this motion and held
the facts were not applicable to the Caperton holding. Id.; see also Fine v. Sheriff of L.A.
Cnty., 356 Fed. App'x 998, 999 (9th Cir. 2009); Smith v. Bender, No. 09-1003, 2009 WL
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door to disqualification motions under the Due Process Clause brought under
claims of "probability of bias" will "diminish the confidence of the American
people in the fairness and integrity of their courts.''
2. Justice Scalia
Justice Scalia points out the majority's reasoning for implementing this
new disqualification rule was to keep the public's confidence in the judicial
system. 82 He urges that this ruling will have the opposite effect due to all
the unnecessary Caperton motions that will be passing through the court
system. 183 Justice Scalia also feels a plethora of billable hours will be wasted
by attorneys reading through countless volumes of campaign finance reports,
and countless more in contesting non-disqualification decisions through
every available means possible as a result of the Caperton decision.' 84
Also, Justice Scalia poses the question: "[S]hould judges sometimes re-
cuse even where the clear commands of our prior due process law do not
require it?' ' 85 He feels some imperfections and wrongs are nonjusticiable
and that is why it is sometimes ineffective to try to right every wrong that
comes before the Court. 186 Therefore, Justice Scalia feels some problems
with the Constitution cannot be fixed, and trying to fix them will only lead to
more harm. 1
87
2902563, at *3 (10th Cir. Sept. 11, 2009), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 2097 (2010); W.T. and K.T.
ex rel. J.T. v. Bd. of Educ. of the Sch. Dist. of N.Y.C., 716 F. Supp. 2d 270, 285-86 (S.D.N.Y.
2010); Wilson v. Warden, No. 3:10-cv-54, 2010 WL 717273, at *4 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 1, 2010);
Henry v. Jefferson Cnty. Comm'n, No. 3:06-CV-33, 2009 WL 2857819, at *2-6 (N.D. W. Va.
Sept. 2, 2009); Blackwell v. United States, No. 2:08-cv-00168, 2009 WL 6315322, at *41
(S.D. Ohio Sept. 22, 2009); Valente v. Univ. of Dayton, No. 3:08-cv-225, 2009 WL 4255508,
at *4 (S.D. Ohio Nov. 19, 2009); Weisshaus v. New York, No. 08 Civ. 4053(DLC), 2009 WL
4823932, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 15, 2009); Littrell v. United States, No. 4:07CV1707 CDP,
2009 WL 5220156, at *5 (E.D. Mo. Dec. 31, 2009); Rhiel v. Hook (In re Johnson), 408 B.R.
123, 127 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 2009); People v. Garza, No. E049043, 2010 WL 3530425, at *1-2
(Cal. 4th Dist. Ct. App. Sept. 13, 2010); E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. Aquamar S.A., 24
So. 3d 585, 585-86 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2009) (per curiam); In re Marriage of O'Brien, 912
N.E.2d 729, 742-43 (I11. App. Ct. 2009).
181. Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2274 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
182. Id. at 2274 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
183. Id.; see United States v. Basciano, 382 Fed. App'x 28, 33 (2d Cir. 2010); Gaddy v.
Brewer, No. 1:10-cv-59-LG-RHW, 2010 WL 3025025, at *2 (S.D. Miss. June 18, 2010).
184. Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2274 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
185. Id. at 2275; see Bauer v. Shepard, 634 F. Supp. 2d 912, 949-50 (N.D. Ind. 2009),
affd by 620 F.3d 704 (7th Cir. Ind. 2010).
186. See Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2275 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
187. See id.
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VI. CONCLUSION
The decision in Caperton will change the landscape of the legal com-
munity in more ways than one. Caperton will allow litigants to always have
a fair tribunal before an impartial judge.' 88 However, I have to agree with the
dissenting opinions in this case. Both of the dissenting Justices warn of the
ramifications this case will bring because of unnecessary disqualification
motions that will plague our judicial system as a result.' 89 The majority
failed to set up any framework for state and federal judges to look at in order
to determine if they should be disqualified.'90
Judicial autonomy is at the heart of the Constitution.' 91 The Framers
gave federal judges life terms and protected their salaries from Congress to
make them independent and not susceptible to outside influence. 192 There-
fore, taking away a judge's freedom to decide if he should be disqualified
ultimately turns into an outcome-oriented affair. 193 From this point on, or
until the Caperton decision is modified, litigants, journalists, and other con-
cerned individuals will search for grounds to challenge a judge's impartiali-
ty. 194 There is also the pitfall of not having enough state or federal justices
at the Supreme Court level to constitute a quorum to even hear the case. 95
The biggest advantage of leaving the decision to judges to disqualify them-
selves was that it stopped "judicial forum shopping."' 96 The new Caperton
disqualification standard will unavoidably encourage the concept. 97 In the
aftermath of the Caperton scandal, former Chief Justice Maynard lost his
seat on the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals, and likely, Justice Ben-
jamin will not be far behind him.' 98 West Virginia and many other states are
188. Id. at 2259 (citing In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955)).
189. Id. at 2274 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting); id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
190. Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2267 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
19 1. Jack N. Rakove, The Original Justifications for Judicial Independence, 95 GEO. L.J.
1061, 1062 (2007).
192. Id.; see also Cravens, supra note 37, at 18-21 (pointing out that stringent disqualifi-
cation rules are not precise enough to figure out the often unapproachable question of what
actual bias is and when it is present).
193. See Julie A. Robinson, Judicial Independence: The Need for Education About the
Role of the Judiciary, 46 WASHBURN L.J. 535, 539 (2007). "[T]he founders, in their consi-
dered and educated judgment, determined that on [the] balance, the need for a judiciary free of
political or undue influence necessitated a judiciary that could render decisions without alle-
giance to the popular opinions or the most vocal proponents in the community." Id. at 540.
194. Meiser, supra note 27, at 1828.
195. See Lewis, supra note 30, at 385.
196. See Lochner, supra note 32, at 231-32.
197. Id.
198. Meiser, supra note 27, at 1834.
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considering judicial reform to add on to the Caperton framework. 99 No sys-
tem can ever be perfect and not every decision can be free of any sort of bias
or prejudice. 2°°
I wholeheartedly agree that a judge should be disqualified in cases
where actual bias or prejudice exists due to campaign contributions. Howev-
er, to assume that every judge will be biased is a plunge I am not willing to
take. In order for this new judicial disqualification rule to succeed, the Court
needs to provide more guidelines or a basic framework so the judiciary can
be symmetrical and fair throughout.2 1 The way the new disqualification rule
is written, judges might disqualify themselves when it is not needed or not
disqualify themselves when it is needed. Furthermore, judges need to know
how much a donor needs to contribute to the judicial campaign before the
individual is considered a big donor and what exactly is considered a large
campaign contribution. The forty fundamental questions Chief Justice Ro-
berts proposed in his dissenting opinion will need to be addressed in later
decisions by the Court because if judges have to consider these factors before
even hearing any facts of a case, it might cause our judicial system to come
to a complete standstill.
202
Currently, judges at the state or federal level are not required to provide
any written or oral reasons as to why they are denying a litigant's motion for
disqualification.2 3 This has always been a major problem in our judicial
system because it creates uncertainty and does not provide any clarity to the
litigant who requested the disqualification.204 Thus, if the Supreme Court
were to hand down a decision expressly requiring judges to give written or
oral reasons as to why they are denying a litigant's motion for disqualifica-
tion, it could be a better solution than the one Caperton has surmised. The
decision in Caperton was a good start in the right direction to finally put an
end to any sort of judicial bias or prejudice that takes place, but since the
Court failed to set up a workable framework for judges to follow, it might
end up being a major setback. Therefore, I believe all the unnecessary Ca-
perton disqualification motions that will be filed as a result of this decision
will become a major epidemic in our country and one in which we certainly
do not need.
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., Inc., 129 S. Ct. 2252, 2267 (2009) (Roberts, C.J.,
dissenting).
202. Id. at 2269-72.
203. Cravens, supra note 37, at 29.
204. See id.
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